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Smith  and  Subbarao  consider  the vexing  question  of what  role  safefy  net  transfers  should
play  in  very low  income  countries  where  a large  share of the population  lives in absolute
poverty  and  the  state  has  very  limited  resources  to  fund  transfers.  They  explore  three
fundamental  constraints,  all of which are  accentuated  in these  countries,  the availability  of
accurate  information to identify beneficiaries,  the  administrative  capacity to target them,  and
the fiscal affordability of transfers  and assess the implications for program choice and design.
They  conclude  that  at  expected  growth  rates  the  number  of people  living  below
minimum  acceptable  consumption  levels  will  remain  so  high that  some  forrn  of safety  net
intervention  is justified,  but that  to  minimize  the  fiscal  trade-off,  safety  net  expenditures
should  be  used  to  simultaneously  finance  other  investments  that  contribute  to  long-run
poverty  reduction  (such  as  roads  or  irrigation  works  under  public  employment  schemes).
Second,  for pure transfers, governments  should be selective of very specific groups-such  as
orphans-to  limit  costs  and  engender  political  support.  Third,  to  improve  the  impact  per
dollar  spent  on  transfers,  programs  should  be  selected  that  have  a  multiplier  effect  on
incomes  (examples  include  vouchers  for small fertilizer  packs for the poor),  or leveraged  by
using  the  small  amounts  of cash  to  help  households  reduce  risk  or  diversify  economic
activity.  Fourth,  to  get  around  the  information  constraint,  choose  programs  that  are  self-
targeting,  such  as public works  at a low wage  rate  or subsidized  inferior  food goods.  Fifth,
the judicious  timing of transfers  is important,  for example,  during the lean  season  when the
opportunity  cost of labor is lowest, or just before planting time. And finally, programs should
be  kept  as  simple  as  possible  to  fit  with  the  limited  administrative  capacity,  avoiding
multiple,  overlapping  donor  programs  in  favor  of  one  or  two  simple  nationwide
programs that are easily implementable,  cost-effective,  and fiscally sustainable.Table of Contents
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I. Introduction
This  paper  looks  at  the  question  of transfer  programs  for  the  poor  in  very  low  income
countries.  The  fundamental  contradiction  is obvious:  those  countries  that  most need  safety
nets--with the lowest per capita incomes  and very  large proportions in absolute poverty--are
the ones  that can least afford them.  Under these circumstances,  what is the "right"  safety net
strategy?
The  answer  is  not  obvious.  Governments  and  the  international  donor  community
generally  want  to  assist those  who  are  living  in  abject  poverty,  but  in  these  countries  the
competing claims on public expenditure  are so great and revenue-raising  capacity  so limited,
that little is available for transfer programs,  while the numbers of the very poor are just too
large to be able to realistically expect to support them. Furthermore, if  poverty is the result of
lack of growth and fundamental structural issues, providing transfers to the poor may not be a
rational strategy.
The General Characteristics of Very Low Income Countries
We  are  looking mostly at the very poorest countries:  those below about US$300 per capita
income  annually,  countries  such as  Ethiopia, Nepal,  Mali,  Chad,  Malawi,  and  Niger.  Such
countries generally exhibit a number of common characteristics:
*  They have very low average  incomes
*  They  are generally  not  on a growth path that  would significantly reduce  poverty in
the near future
*  They have very limited resources to fund transfers  to the poor
*  They are often in the early stages of transition out of subsistence  agriculture.
There are  three factors that affect what is possible in terms of safety net interventions:
fiscal  affordability,  the  availability  of  adequate  information  on  beneficiaries,  and  the
' For helpful  comments  and suggestions,  the authors  are  very grateful  to  Harold  Alderman,  Lionel Demery,
Margaret Grosh, and participants at three Bank seminars held as the work progressed.administrative  capacity  to  target  programs.  In  this  group  of countries  all  three  are  often
binding constraints, and this has an impact on the choice and design of interventions.
Table  1 provides  a list of such countries,  and  some of the  fundamental  attributes that
characterize  them.  A second and similar group of countries are those with larger economies
and somewhat  more robust growth rates, but which nonetheless  have very large numbers of
the  world's'  poorest  people,  often  concentrated  in  particular  areas  or  groups.  This  group
includes countries such as Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Vietnam, and Uganda.
Finally, there is a group of countries that exhibits  specialized characteristics  that affect
the nature of poverty and the approach to safety nets either because they are in a post-conflict
situation or because  they are  going through a process  of transition.  These  include countries
such as Angola,  Burundi, Mongolia, Sierra Leone, and Tajikistan.
Table 1 - Characteristics of Selected  Very Low Income Countries
Percentage of
Average  Growth ofper  population  Percentage  of
growth rate  capita income  below poverty  labor  force in
Per  capita  1977-97  1977-97  line  agriculture
Country  GNP  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)
Burkina Faso  $ 250  3.4  0.8  n.a.  93
Chad  $ 230  2.0  0.5  64  84
Ethiopia  $ 110  1.7  -1.2  n.a.  86
Malawi  $ 210  3.0  0  54  87
Mali  $ 260  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  86
Mozambique  $ 210  0.4  -2.2  n.a.  82
Nepal  $ 210  4.3  1.7  42  95
Niger  $ 200  0.6  -2.8  63  91
Nigeria  $ 280  1.0  -1.9  43  43
Tanzania  $ 210  n.a.  n.a.  51  85
Source:  World Development  Indicators, 2000 and 2001.
For  our  purposes,  safety  nets  are  taken  to  include  any  direct  transfers  to  the  poor,
whether  in cash  or in  kind  (e.g.,  food  and fertilizer),  with or without  a  work requirement.
Examples  include public works programs,  food distribution  and feeding programs, discount
and  voucher  schemes,  and--to  a  lesser  extent  in  very  poor  countries--pensions  and  cash
entitlements.  We are not including broader schemes designed to raise the incomes of the poor
more permanently, such as credit and income-generating  programs, which are seen as part of
the broader development program.
Our basic premise is that given the  fiscal constraints,  the scope for spending on safety
nets  in these  countries  is  extremely  limited  and,  as  a point  of departure,  one wants  to be
spending  the  minimum  necessary  amount  on  pure  transfers.  Having  said  that,  there  are
compelling  reasons  for  still  considering  some  form  of safety  net  transfers  in  very  poor
countries, because  (i) at expected growth rates there are going to remain very  large numbers
2of poor, the poorest of whom are  living at consumption  levels which are unacceptably  low;
(ii) there are reasons to believe  that improving  equity through redistributive transfers  may be
good for growth; and (iii) that such transfers in fact represent an investment in future growth
by avoiding the erosion of human capital (for example through malnutrition or disinvestment
in assets) that accompanies  extreme poverty, especially during short-term crises.  The trick is
to do this in such a way that  it minimizes  distortionary  incentives.  Given the  limitations  on
what is affordable,  it is also important that transfers be as selective  as possible and that they
are engineered  in  such a way  as to lift the constraints  to income growth  of the  poor in the
longer run.
Issues  examined  in  this  paper  include  ways  of being  selective  of subgroups  and  of
interventions  (to maximize the impact for each dollar spent), of using expenditures on safety
net programs  to help  lift  constraints  to  development  and  poverty reduction,  and  to choose
program  designs  that  recognize  the  extremely  tight  information  and  administrative
constraints in these countries.
Structure of the Paper
Section 2 examines the role of safety nets in a poverty reduction  strategy more broadly, both
in the context of growth and of income distribution,  in very low income countries (VLICs).  It
examines the limited empirical evidence  on the characteristics  of poverty in these countries
to see  what implications  there  are for the  choice of safety nets.  Building  on this,  it looks  at
the possible objectives a safety net could be expected to serve  in very low income economies,
and  Section  3 considers  what  is  feasible  given  the  administrative  and  fiscal  constraints.
Section  4  briefly  describes  the  program  choices  that  might  be considered,  and  Section  5
examines some of the particular social and political characteristics  of very poor countries that
affect how we think about safety nets.
H. The Role of Transfers in a Poverty Reduction  Strategy
Growth and Safety Nets
While it may seem obvious, it is important to emphasize at the outset that safety nets must be
located  in the  context of a wider  development  strategy.  The only lasting solution to poverty
in  these  countries  is  labor-absorbing  growth,  and  the primary  efforts  need  to  be  directed
towards  achieving more rapid and more equitable growth.
The  root causes  of chronically  low  incomes,  low productivity of labor  in subsistence
agriculture--the  lack of off-farm employment  opportunities,  failure to diversify cropping,  and
insufficient  education  and infrastructure--are  not  going to be  solved by safety  net transfers
and addressing these needs remain at the center of any poverty reduction strategy.
Having said that, even  at the most optimistic growth rates the numbers of absolute poor
are  not  going  to  decline  rapidly  enough.  Table  2  illustrates  the  growth  rates  required  to
reduce  the number  of poor  in  a sample  of countries.  As can  be  seen  from  the  table,  the
growth rates  required  are  substantially  higher  than those  achieved  historically.  It  therefore
seems unrealistic  to expect  that growth  alone will  adequately  improve  the  incomes  of the
poor--especially  of the poorest--within  a reasonable  timeframe  and that some kind of safety
net is therefore justified.
:3Table 2: Minimum Growth Rates in National Income  Needed  to Prevent a Rising Number of
Poor Under a Distributionally Neutral Growth Scenario - Selected  Countries
Minimum GDP  growth required
under given population  growth  Actual growth record
(percent)  (percent)
Country Population  growth rate:  2.0  2.5  3.0  1990-2000
Nigeria  3.4  4.3  5.1  3.0
Tanzania  5.2  6.5  7.8  3.5
Kenya  4.2  5.2  6.3  1.9
Malawi  4.7  5.8  7.0  3.9
Mauritania  3.6  4.5  5.4  3.5
Rwanda  3.4  4.2  5.0  2.4
Senegal  4.6  5.8  7.0  3.4
Uganda  4.4  5.5  6.7  6.7
Zimbabwe  4.2  5.3  6.4  2.3
Source: Authors' calculations,  actual growth rates from World Bank data.
There  are obvious  reasons, however,  why very poor countries have not operated  safety
net programs in the past: they cannot afford the  cost of pure transfers and the magnitude of
the  poverty  problem  is  such  that  policymakers  generally  despair  of affecting  it  through
transfers.  There are, however,  grounds for thinking that transfers under a safety net may not
be incompatible with longer-run income growth for the poor and may in fact contribute to it.
Recent thinking on the relationship between distribution and growth suggests that it may
be  worth  revisiting  the traditional  view of redistribution  as  purely a  current  consumption
measure.  Work by Bruno, Ravallion and Squire  (1998)  and others  suggests that the level of
distribution  does  matter  for  growth  and  that  more  egalitarian  countries  may  in fact  grow
faster than less egalitarian ones; therefore,  redistributive programs and policies may be  good
not just for the immediate consumption of the poor, but also for longer-run poverty reduction.
It should be noted, however, that what is more important than the distribution of income
is the initial distribution of assets--particularly  land, but also education and access to finance.
The analysis also found that while the poor generally benefit from growth enhancing policies,
the  effect of investment  is particularly  important  in determining  how  much  they  benefit.
Therefore while  redistributive programs  can potentially help the poor--both  immediately and
in the longer run--it is critically important they do so in a way that does not reduce the overall
level of investment.
The  implication,  which  we will  explore  in  more  depth  later,  is  if one  is  to consider
safety net transfers  in these  countries, it is important that  as far as possible they be  used to
simultaneously finance  some form of investment for longer-run propoor growth.
A  second strand of thought is to start to think of safety net transfers themselves  as an
investment  in  human  capital  in  these  countries,  rather  than  as  a pure  consumption  cost.
Transfers  under  circumstances  of  extreme  poverty  can  represent  an  investment  in
4maintaining human productivity  in the longer run,  among those who would otherwise  suffer
irreparable  danage  either  physically  or economically.  Obvious  examples  include  the long-
term damage  done by severe malnutrition  in early childhood,  the failure  of orphans  or street
children to attend school, or the sale of household assets such as land or livestock in times of
crises,  all of which safety  nets can be  used to protect  against.  We do  not know  at this  stage
analytically what this tells us about how much  sense it makes to spend on transfers;  but it is
an  important point  to make  to decisionmakers  that spending  on short-term  support for the
poorest also represents an investment in the future of the country.
How  policymakers  perceive  growth  prospects  also  has  an  impact  on  the  approach  to
safety nets.  If extreme  poverty is  seen  as a transitional  phenomenon,  which  is likely  to be
relieved  by  growth  and  structural  change  in the  foreseeable  future,  then  this has  different
implications  than  if the growth  trajectory  is such  that there  appears  to be  little prospect  of
reducing widespread poverty within a reasonable timeframe.
The  question  is  then  whether  there  is  some  way  in  which  growth  prospects  are
fundamentally  different  among  this  group of very  low  income  countries.  One  wants to  be
wary  of  generalizing,  and  there  are  of course  always  exceptions,  but  the  historic  record
suggests  that  for  some  set of reasons  these  economies  are  following  consistently  lower
growth paths, even than other very poor countries.
Table 3 - Growth in Very Low Income Countries Compared to All Low-Income  Economies
(Average  GDP growth 1965-97,  percent)
VLICs  2.3
All low-income  economies  3.8
Note:  VLICs average  from a sample of 15  countries for which data are available,  1965-97.
Source:  World Development Indicators, 2000 and 2001.
There  may be reasons  these  economies  are  less prone to poverty-reducing  growth (for
example  11  of the  15 countries in the sample above are landlocked;  all suffer from excessive
population  pressure  on  very  limited  resource  bases;  and  they  generally  have  few  natural
resources  and are dependent on agriculture in semi-arid climates.)
If  it  is  true,  however,  that  expected  growth  is  low,  then  this  has  some  worrying
implications.  Among other things, it implies that the returns to investment are  lower than in
other  economies,  which  is  counterintuitive  in  that  one  would  expect  greater  returns  in
countries  at the bottom  of the  development  curve.  This  is not trivial  because  the trade-off
between safety  net  transfers  and other growth-inducing  expenditures  is very  much  affected
by the returns  one might  expect to them. If poverty  is  expected  to  be long term and if the
binding  constraints  to  growth  are  less  amenable  to  public  investment  the  argument  for
spending on transfers to the poor as a way of alleviating poverty may be greater.
Whether the growth prospects of this group of countries are inherently lower than others
is  a  wider question,  which  deserves  deeper  investigation.  At  a minimum,  in evaluating  the
approach to safety nets, staff should examine realistic growth projections  for the country and
5the projected number of poor at various growth rates and present this to decisionmakers  as a
framework for thinking about possible safety net strategies.
Safety Nets and  Income Distribution
An important question to ask at the outset is whether a safety net is to support all those who
are poor (and if so, how poor?),  or only a subgroup  of the very poorest.  In considering  the
potential  role  of safety  nets it is  worth examining  the  distribution  of income  in the  very
poorest countries and asking if there is some way in which it differs from that in developing
countries more generally  and  whether the shape of the income distribution  tells us anything
about how we should think about the role of transfers.
In general  one would expect the distribution  to be  flatter in very  low income countries
(because the average  is so low that people  living  far below the mean would not survive  and
there  is  little  surplus  for a  middle  class  to  accumulate).  Under  these  conditions,  at  least
among the poorest 50 percent or so, the distribution  of income would be fairly even around a
very low mean,  and there would not be an easily identifiable group of ultra poor.
If the distribution  of income  is very  flat, there  is less of a  case  for safety  nets as  a
redistributive  mechanism  (there  are  too  many  possible  recipients,  and  they  are  too
undifferentiated),  and it probably makes more sense to focus on measures to reduce poverty
generally and to use public  safety nets to insure  the whole  group  against particular  income
shocks  (such  as  drought  or  seasonal  scarcity).  If  on  the  other  hand  there  is  a  clear
discontinuity, then the case is greater for a focused  transfer in support of the very poorest.
The graphs in Figure  1 show the per capita expenditure  or income distribution for three
very low income countries. The shapes of the distributions  in the figure do not differ greatly
from  those of low-income  countries  more  broadly.  There  is,  however,  evidence  that even
within these economies  those at the bottom  end  are  substantially  worse off than the  poor
generally.  As  in  any  society  there  are  those  who  are  extremely  poor  due  to  infirmity,
disability, and old age, but the evidence suggests that there is a core of very poor that spreads
beyond  this  group.  Table  4  shows  examples  of average  incomes  in  the  bottom  decile,
compared  with those in the next-poorest group and the poor generally.
What is striking is that the average  incomes  among the poorest decile are generally  30
percent-40  percent lower than those of the group  in the  next poorest decile  and typically  40
percent  -50  percent  of those  among  the  poorest  half of the  population.  In  countries  with
particularly  skewed  distribution  of incomes--such  as  Malawi  and  Niger--incomes  for the
poorest  10 percent are only one-quarter of those among the poor generally.  It is possible that
some  of this  differential  is  due  to measurement  problems,  but  generally  such  large-scale
household  surveys  are  accepted  to  provide  a  relatively  accurate  picture  of consumption
levels,  and the  fact that the  finding  is consistent  across  many  countries  suggests  that it is
fairly robust.
Also,  closer  examination  of  data  often  reveals  significant  discontinuities  in  other
characteristics  among the poor.  For example, in Malawi  and Nepal while landholdings  were
uniformly  small  among  the  poor  (averaging  about  0.5  ha in the  bottom  50  percent  of the
population), in the bottom decile they dropped precipitously.
6Figure 1: Distributions of Income and Expenditure in Several Very Low Income Countries
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The  relevant  question  for  policymakers  is  whether  there  exists  some  group  of
identifiable  "ultra-poor"  that  is worth  targeting  with  safety  net  support.  The evidence,  in
terms of distribution  of incomes  (Table  4)  and  attributes  such  as  landholding  (Table  5),
suggests  that there  is and  that when  designing  safety  nets  for  a given  country  it is worth
examining the data in some depth to determine  (i)  if there is such as group and (ii) whether
there is some measurable  attribute  that  can be  used to identify  it. Against this needs to be
weighed the political  costs of being more selective  (discussed below) and the administrative
cost and feasibility of actually identifying and targeting the households  in this group.
It is worth being  forewarned  that this finding often runs counter to popular perception.
Policymakers  and politicians  in VLICs  often do not share  the view  that there is a group of
very poor (apart from obvious groups such as the disabled or elderly infirm) with whom they
should be especially  concerned.  A commonly heard  sentiment is that "everyone  is poor"  at
the  village  level,  and  even  in  qualitative  poverty  surveys  people  often  group  a  large
proportion of rural population--typically  one-third or more--as "poor" or "very poor" without
distinguishing  a smaller  subset of the very poorest that the data suggest exist.  It is therefore
particularly important to examine the distribution of income and characteristics  of the poor in
order to present a convincing case.
7Table 4 - Average Per Capita Expenditure of the Poor and the Poorest - Selected  Very Low
Income Countries
(Nominal  per capita household expenditure in local currency - various survey years)
Average expenditure of:  Ratio ofpoorest  decile to:
Poorest 10  Next 10  Bottom 50  Next  Average bottom
percent  percent  percent  poorest  50  percent
Burkina Faso (1994)  150.9  230.1  270.6  0.69  0.58
Mali (1994)  110.5  180.7  230.9  0.61  0.48
Niger (1995)  50.0  110.6  190.9  0.43  0.25
Tanzania (1993)  290.6  420.1  510.1  0.70  0.58
Ethiopia (1996)  327.0  464.0  549.0  0.70  0.60
Nepal (1996)  2152.0  2987.0  3540.0  0.72  0.61
Malawi (1993)  101.0  246.0  417.0  0.41  0.25
Note:  Nominal  per capita household  expenditure  in  local  currency  from  year of survey.  All rural  except
Nepal (nationwide)  and Malawi (smallholders only); results are not much different for urban sample.
Source: Country household  income/expenditure  surveys, various years.
Can a Safety Net Program  Aim at Protecting  a Minimum Level of Consumption? One
way to define a safety net strategy  is to select,  design, and target a program that protects  a
certain  absolute  minimum level of consumption.  The food poverty line is generally the most
obvious candidate. The justification for such an approach is that society as a whole considers
it unacceptable  for people  to be  living below the  food poverty line  owing to the  threat of
starvation.  This  approach  is  closely  related  to  Sen's  (1981)  entitlements  approach:  the
amount  of food  he  or  she  can  command  through  a  combination  of production,  sale,  or
exchange  of assets  and  sale  of their  labor  power,  plus transfers  from others  may  not be
adequate  for  survival.  When  that happens,  there  is an entitlement  failure,  calling  for public
action.2
Table 5 - Differences  in Landholding among the Poor
Average landholding  Malawi (ha.)
All rural population  0.79
Poorest 50 percent  0.53
Poorest  10 percent  0.25
Source: Malawi  income/expenditure  survey,  1993.
Can a Safety Net Program  Aim  at Protecting a Minimum Level of Consumption? One
way to define  a  safety net strategy is to select,  design,  and target a program that protects  a
certain  absolute minimum level of consumption.  The food poverty line is generally the most
2  Sen argues  that starvation  is the  result of not having  enough to eat.  It is not  the result  of there  not being
enough to eat. While  the  latter can be a cause of the former,  it is but  one of several  possible  causes.  See  Sen
(1981).  See also his Coromandel Lecture  (Sen 1982).
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it unacceptable  for people  to  be  living  below the  food  poverty  line  owing to the  threat  of
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Can governments  of very low income countries  afford to defend a critical minimum  of
food  consumption  for  every  citizen?  At  one  time  a  poor  country  such  as  Sri  Lanka  was
spending  as much as  5 percent  of GDP  on food subsidies.  Calculations  for three  very poor
countries  show  that  to  fill  the  whole  of the  food  poverty  gap,  countries  need  to  spend
somewhere  between  2.5  percent  to  15  percent  of  GDP  on  safety  net  transfers  alone,
excluding  the cost of administration  (see  Table  6).  One might legitimately  argue  that such  a
high level of expenditure  is not an affordable  option for poor countries,  especially when tax
revenues  are meager and the scope for redistributive taxation itself is limited.
Table 6 - Fiscal  Cost of Closing  the Food Poverty Gap: Illustrative Estimates  for Three Very
Poor Countries'
Country/Year  GNP  per capita, 1995 (US$)  Fiscal  cost as percentage of GDP
Nepal,  1995  211  15.1
Niger,  1993  - 200  2.4
Madagascar,  1993-94  225  9-11
1  Transfer cost only,  excluding administrative  costs.
Source: Authors'  calculations.
Granting that  a country  does decide to fill the food poverty  gap,  the issue of potential
trade-offs  to such  a high investmnent  needs  to be  considered.  The trade-off is  between  the
state taking  direct  responsibility  for  defending the  entitlement  of every  citizen,  versus  the
state trying to achieve the same objective  indirectly via encouraging investment and a higher
rate  of growth.  While  conceptually  attractive,  it  is  not  easy  empirically  to  quantify  these
trade-offs.  Extensive  research  comparing India's  Kerala,  Sri  Lanka,  and China  suggests that
reliance on the indirect approach may take an unacceptably  long period to achieve the levels
of longevity that was possible with the direct approach in a short span of time.4
Another  issue relates to  incentives.  If the state takes direct responsibility for filling the
whole  of food  poverty  gap,  would  it not  discourage  poor  households  from  reducing  their
labor supply in income-earning  opportunities?  Evidence from Sri Lanka (Sahn and Aldermnan
1995  and Jamaica  (Ezemenari  and Subbarao  1999)  suggests that even very poor households
do respond  to transfers,  often  by  reducing  their  labor  supply.  As  a  consequence,  the  real
transfer  from  a publicly  funded  program  is  lower than  the  nominal  transfer.  In the  case  of
3  Sen  argues that  starvation  is  the result  of not having  enough to  eat.  It is not the result  of there  not  being
enough to  eat.  While  the  latter  can  be  a cause of the former,  it is but  one of several  possible  causes.  See Sen
(1981).  See also his Coromandel  Lecture (Sen  1982).
4For details see Dreze and Sen (1989).
9Jamaica,  for  example,  a food  stamp  program,  ignoring  such behavioral  responses,  would
have provided the poor with an improved food consumption level of 6.8 percent.  Factoring in
behavioral responses, however, would reduce the change in food consumption by very poor
households  to only 2.5  percent.  It is worth stressing  though that such behavioral  responses
may be highly desirable in themselves;  the poorest are the most overworked and a preference
for  leisure  may  enhance  their well-being.  Nevertheless,  adverse  behavioral  responses  do
mitigate against the policymakers'  objective of defending a certain critical minimum level of
consumption.
The above discussion suggests  that it is justified to provide limited assistance to those
who are  at acute risk of starvation, though a policy to fill the entire food poverty gap may be
problematic if adopted without a careful  evaluation of issues of affordability, trade-offs,  and
adverse incentives.
Safety Nets and  Risk Reduction - The Insurance  Function of Transfers
Risk--or more properly, insuring against risk--is increasingly  seen as the primary function of
public safety nets (Holzmann and Jorgenson 1999). Under this formulation the objective is to
protect  households  against  precipitous  drops  in consumption  either  by helping them insure
themselves  against  shocks  or  by  allowing  them  to  take  on  "riskier,"  but  higher  return,
activities.
If it  is  not  feasible--fiscally,  politically,  and  administratively--to  fill the  entire  food
poverty  gap,  can  safety  net policy  intervention be limited to  protecting  households  against
unacceptable  drops  in  (food)  consumption?  This  would  mean  insurance  against  risk  and
implies maintaining  a food  consumption  level  around  a historically  given  mean  for every
household.  This policy is contrasted  with "filling the food poverty gap" policy in Figure 2.
The fiscal implications  of filling the food poverty gap (areas A+B in Figure 2) may be much
higher than filling only the shortfalls in consumption around a mean (area A).
Approaching  the role of safety net from the perspective of risk reduction in VLICs may
be questioned  on the grounds  that poor households  in these countries  are  so poor that they
cannot  generate  adequate incomes  to buy food entitlements  even during  normal times; their
landholdings are too small, productivity too low, and off-farm  employment opportunities too
limited.
Put another  way,  risk,  which  essentially  amounts  to  variance  of income  around  the
mean, is perhaps less of an issue when the mean is so low that people are close to starvation.
One could argue that under these circumstances the objective of a public safety net should be
to  first bring these  people  up to an acceptable  level of consumption  and only secondly to
insure against specific shocks.
10Figure 2: Filling Food Poverty Gap versus Protecting Shortfalls in Food Consumption
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Source:  Authors.
Obviously the two  are not mutually exclusive,  and  the very poor  also  face  substantial
income risks. It is an empirical question as to whether risk is more or less the defining issue
in a particular  country  and for  a particular group,  but the balance  between chronically  low
incomes  and risk-related  consumption  drops will have  a big  influence  on what the "right"
choice of safety net program will be.
The risks and impacts on the poor can  be illustrated  as in Table 7. The policy/program
responses in each of these cases may vary by the nature of risk  and by country.  First let us
consider  covariate  risks.  In  a country  where  seasonal  dips  in  food availability  are  rare,  a
single  shock may definitely cause  some hardship to poor households,  but evidence  suggests
that they usually bounce  back  (Lokshin and Ravallion 2000), requiring  probably little or no
intervention.  If  such  seasonal  dips  are  repeated  at  frequent  intervals,  as  in  Ethiopia  or
Malawi,  then the  need for  income-smoothing  intervention is more urgent.  Usually a public
workfare program is the preferred  choice (Ravallion  1999; Subbarao et al. 1997).
Where  a  large  shock  intervenes  (drought,  flood,  macroeconomic  adjustment),  policy
responses may vary by country situation and the nature of shocks. Thus in a country that is
predominantly  agricultural,  growing  subsistence  crops  for  self-consumption,  a
macroeconomic  shock may be expected to hurt the urban poor proportionately more than the
rural  poor,  in which  case  a small  scale  urban  intervention  may  be  the  right  approach  (a
subsidy  on  a food  item  if it encourages  self-selection).  In a  country  with  exactly  similar
characteristics,  a drought  or flood may have  serious  consequences  throughout the economy,
rural  and  urban,  calling  for  a  nationwide  intervention.  It  is  best to  opt for  self-targeted
11workfare  because  the  intervention  is  capable  of complementing  the  growth  process  via
infrastructure building, thus minimizing  the trade-off with investments  for economic  growth.
It is worth stressing that even middle-income East Asian economies that were hit by financial
crises have resorted to a low wage self-targeted public workfare program (Subbarao  1999).
Table 7 - Risks and Impacts on the Poor
Risks  Impacts on the poor
A. Systemic,  covariate  risks:
Macroeconomic  shocks  Unemployment, staple food price increase
Drought  Food shortages, price increases, unemployment
Seasonal food shortages  Staple food price increases
B.  Idiosyncratic  risks:
Age and infirmity  Destitution
Loss of breadwinner  (HIV/AIDS)  Destitution, orphaned
Temporary loss of employment  Temporary loss of income earning capacity
Source:  Authors.
As  for  idiosyncratic  risks,  interventions  may  once  again vary  by  risk and  a country's
socioeconomic  situation.  In the cultural milieu of countries such as India and Nepal, loss of a
breadwinner  and  consequential  widowhood  may  lead  to  virtual  destitution  owing  to
widespread  societal  discrimination.  A social pension  targeted  on the basis of that  particular
type of vulnerability may be the right and probably  cost-effective intervention,  because both
inclusion and  exclusion  errors  will likely be minimal  and identification  of the individual  is
relatively  easy.  On  the  other  hand,  dealing  with  idiosyncratic  risks  such  as  HIV/AIDS-
induced loss of a breadwinner  or orphanhood  is more difficult. The policy response depends
very  much  on  how  households  are  currently  coping  with  such  risks.  For  example,  if
community  initiatives  are  widespread,  strengthening  community  action, possibly  with cash
grants, may be the right approach.  If,  on the other hand,  communities are  overburdened,  an
institutional  intervention may be necessary.  Any intervention needs to be designed only after
a careful participatory evaluation and focus group meetings with communities.
There  are two  compelling reasons for using public  transfers to reduce risk: one is that
the poor are often more susceptible to variations  in income and less able to withstand shocks
and the other is that  some form of insurance  may allow them to take on the greater risk that
leads  to  higher  long-term  income.  (Examples  include  using  purchased  inputs  such  as
fertilizer,  or diversifying  into  cash crops; both of which the poorest may be reluctant to do,
even though  they yield higher returns,  because  they entail  greater potential  loss in the event
of failure.) The attraction of focusing on risk insurance  is that one can have more leverage--in
terms of welfare  impact--for a given level of expenditure,  which is particularly important in
tightly fiscally-constrained  VLICs.
In very low income countries the poor often  face compounding  shocks. In most of sub-
Saharan Africa,  for example, they are  affected by the dual threat  of periodic  drought and of
HIV/AIDS,  and whereas  families  (and communities)  may be resilient enough  to withstand
the impact of one or the other  of these,  they are  overwhelmed  at having to cope  with both
12simultaneously.  Compounding  of risks may have  two important policy implications:  first, a
household's  capacity to bounce back may be severely  restricted,  thus pushing the household
to permanent destitution unless aided by a transfer and second, risk compounding may cause
permanent  damage  to  human capital  (withdrawing  children  from  school,  increase  in child
labor, etc.) Also, public action in this case may be required more quickly than otherwise.
Finally,  it is worth noting that many risks may be most effectively  protected  against not
by safety nets,  but by other measures.  For example,  land  reforms,  investments  in irrigation
and  crop  diversification,  or  financial  market  development  may  all  have  more  impact  on
reducing  risk  among  the  poor  (and  raising  their  incomes)  than  any  explicit  safety  net
measure.
Cycling In and Out of Poverty. A related  question  is  whether the  poor--especially  the
very  poor--are  made  up  of essentially  the  same  people  from  year  to  year  or  consist  of
different individuals  and  households that  cycle in  and out of poverty,  with one  group being
poor one year,  but relatively better off the next, while others fall into poverty.  If the latter, it
argues much more  for providing  temporary relief to a changing group of households,  rather
than sustained transfers to a set of consistently poor.  In other words, do the chronically poor
remain poor regardless of movements  or changes  in the economy?  There  is some empirical
evidence  on  this  question  drawn  from  India.  An  early  study  based  on  national  three-year
panel  data  for  India  found  that  for the  country  as  a whole,  there  was  a 50  percent  to  60
percent probability that households from the poorest  decile remained in the same decile  in all
three years,  whereas the probability of their moving to the next higher decile was only about
30  percent.  (Adelman,  Subbarao,  and  Vashishtha  1985).  There  were  of course  significant
interstate variations in this mobility, the growing states showing a much higher probability of
households  from the poorest decile moving to the next decile.
Using  the  International  Crops  Research  Institute  for  Semi-Arid  Tropics  (ICRISAT)
panel  data for seven  villages  in semi-arid  rural  India,  Gaiha  and Deolalikar (1993)  confirm
the  above  findings.  They  conclude,  "Of particular  concern  is  the finding  that  more  than  a
moderate  share of the  innately poor  are  likely to remain poor  in  spite of a redistribution  of
physical  assets  (such as land) or changes in household size. Their poverty is in large measure
the result of deep-rooted characteristics  that cannot be easily changed in the short or medium
run, some of which are observed, such as schooling of the household head, and others which
are  unobserved,  such  as  managerial  ability  or industriousness.  Relief  works  such  as  rural
public  works  may  help  alleviate  transitory  poverty,  but  are  unlikely  to  make  a  dent  in
persistent poverty."
Seasonality. In most very low income  countries where a majority of the population  and
most of the poor are dependent  on their own production of basic  food crops (typically  rice,
maize,  or rootcrops)  and where there is often a single, short, and unpredictable  rainy season,
seasonality  of  food  supplies  and  prices  plays  a  tremendously  important  role  in  the
determining  the welfare of the poor. Typically prices  are low immediately  after the harvest,
when the poor generally sell  any short-term  surplus they have, they then run out of food and
must purchase  from the market when prices  are highest  in the pre-harvest  lean season.  The
price  differentials  are  especially  high  in  these  economies,  where  private  markets,  trade,
13financing, and storage are often underdeveloped.  In Africa in particular the swing in prices is
substantially  higher than would be expected representing a significant tax on the poor. 5
All of this suggests that counter-cyclical  measures that are seasonally targeted, including
the  possibility  of interventions  to moderate  the variation  in prices,  can  potentially  have  a
major welfare benefit for the poor.
The  risk  of course  is of government  interventions  that  undermine  markets  or  entail
substantial  fiscal costs. Nonetheless, policymakers  should analyze the costs of seasonal food
prices  on the poor and the potential costs and benefits of smoothing interventions.  Obvious
examples include the use of seasonally targeted discounts or subsidies for the poor, the use of
strategic  grain  reserves  to  increase  lean  season  supply,  cross-subsidization  of  publicly
marketed foodgrains (from the abundant to the lean season), programs to provide vouchers in
the "good"  season that can be redeemed at a premium in the lean season, and timing of public
works and other transfers to focus on the lean season.
Some Possible  Roles  for Safety Nets
All of this suggests several possible roles for safety nets in very poor countries:
*  To fill in the deepest part of the poverty gap
*  To bring all (or many) of the poor up to an acceptable consumption level
*  To smooth consumption (e.g., seasonally)
*  To protect against major shocks
*  To  insure against  individual risks,  either idiosyncratic  ones such  as income loss,  or
those that allow the poor to take on riskier, but higher return, activities
*  As an investment (to avoid decapitalization and to keep children in school).
The  choice  will  depend  on  a  combination  of the  nature  of poverty,  the  time-frame
decisionmakers  are concerned with, and the types of risks faced by the poor.
III. What Is Feasible?
The problem in VLICs is often not so much deciding what is desirable in terms of safety nets,
but rather  determining  what  is feasible.  Three  factors  generally  constrain  the feasibility of
safety net programs: (i) the availability of information,  (ii) administrative  capacity,  and (iii)
fiscal  affordability.  Unfortunately,  in the  countries  we  are  considering  all  three  are  often
critically binding.
The Information Constraint
To target programs  at particular  subgroups  or individuals  requires  substantial  information,
information  that  is  often  not  available  and  is  extremely  expensive  to  acquire.  In  most
countries  transfers  are  targeted  on the  basis  of criteria  such  as  income,  or demographic
characteristics  such as household size (for example child allowances) or age (e.g., pensions).
In  the  VLICs  we  are  dealing  with,  however,  household  incomes  consist  mostly  of own
production of foodgrains  and are  almost never known with any certainty  and even the most
5 See for example Alderman and Shively (1996).
14basic  attributes  such  as  age,  or  landholding,  are  generally  not  recorded.  In  Malawi,  for
example, even though it is well known that there is a strong correlation between poverty and
landholding, it proved impossible to target a program designed to provide free fertilizer to the
poor on the basis of landholding, because there is no registration of landholdings.
More  obvious  characteristics,  such  as  female-headed  households,  orphanhood,  or
disability,  can  be  used  to  select  those  who  should  benefit,  but this  presents  problems  of
verification.  For example,  everyone  may suddenly become  an  orphan,  or many households
may suddenly become female-headed,  if transfers of free food or nMoney are available only to
those groups.
One option in cases where income is not known is to derive "proxy" indicators. This can
be  done by using a household  data set to identify other attributes  that are highly correlated
with poverty.  For example household  demographic  characteristics,  educational  status,  or the
type  of  dwelling  have  all  been  used  in  programs  in  Armenia,  Chile,  and  Colombia.  In
Indonesia,  family-planning  program  data  on  household  characteristics  was  used  to  target
welfare  transfers  during  the recent  crisis.  Even these attributes  may not be known  in very
poor  countries,  or  (and perhaps  more  likely)  the capacity  may not be there to  assess them
accurately.
One  final  option  is  to  make  entitlements  dependent  on  participation  in  some  other
program  that is known  to be selective  of the poor.  For example,  eligibility  for free food or
fertilizer  distributions  may be  made  dependent  on participation  in a  (self-targeting)  public
works scheme, or on having a malnourished child in a nutrition program.
There are ultimately three ways around the information constraint:  (i) to select programs
that are self-targeting,  (ii) to use community targeting,  and (iii) to opt for universal  coverage.
Examples of self-targeting programs  include public employment at a below-market wage, or
the  provision  of inferior  goods  that  will  not  generally  be  purchased  by  the  nonpoor.
Community targeting  (discussed  further in the next section)  does not entirely  eliminate the
information  requirements,  but pushes them down to the community level, where information
is presumably  better  known,  cheaper  to collect,  and--to  the extent  that it  is undertaken  by
village  leaders--internalizes  the  costs  of targeting  and  reduces  the  financial  cost  to  the
program.  Universal  entitlement  programs  of  course  eliminate  the  cost  of  identifying
beneficiaries  altogether, but--as discussed below--are generally not affordable in VLICs.
The Administrative Constraint
In  general  the  capacity  to  manage  complex  programs  is  limited  in  VLICs.  Management,
accounting,  logistical,  and  financial  control  systems  are  all  typically  weak,  and  skilled
staffers  are  at  a  premium  in  these  countries.  At  the  same  time,  transfer  programs,  and
especially  targeted  programs  are  extremely  labor-intensive.  Where  the  information  base  is
weak,  and  there  is  not  a  tradition  of  "playing  by  the  rules,"  substantial  middle-level
supervision  is needed to avoid  leakage, to manage  distribution,  and to administer targeting.
Targeted  programs  are  also  intensive  in their use  of outreach staff and especially  of field-
level supervisors.
In VLICs,  however,  workers  at all these  levels  are in short supply.  To attract them  is
expensive  (as can  be  seen  from the  experience  with nongovernmental  organization  (NGO)
15programs)  and  often  not  feasible  with  government  salaries.  Perhaps  more  importantly,  in
countries  where  the  pool  of effective  service  delivery  staff  is  limited,  there  is  also  the
opportunity  cost  of diverting  them  away  from  other  outreach  activities--  be  they  malaria
control, education, HIV/AIDS,  or rural water supply programs.
What  are  the  policy  implications?  One is  to  choose  simple  program  designs that  are
consistent with the implementation  capacity  in the countries.  As a corollary,  programs that
involve simple, repetitive  steps  and are sustained  over a long period of time are more likely
to be  implementable  (and implemented  effectively)  by lower-level  unskilled  staff.  This is  a
point worth bearing in mind in VLICs, where safety net programs are often driven by donors
and sustained only for a few years before being dropped in favor of some other model.
Choosing a few simple  nationwide programs,  rather than running a plethora  of separate
programs  and  sustaining  them  over  a prolonged  period,  is  often  more  likely  to  result in
successful  implementation.  Finally,  in  choosing  program  designs,  decisionmakers  should
explore  the  scope  for  using  existing  administrative  systems.  For  example,  delivering  a
nutrition  program  through  the  existing  network  of  health  posts  and  workers  may  be
preferable  to  establishing  a new  system;  similarly,  using  the  government's  existing  rural
works  and  maintenance  programs  to  maximize  employment  of  the  poor  may  be  more
administratively  feasible  than establishing  a new  public  works  program  apparatus.  In each
case there will be trade-offs (for example the health system may already be overwhelmed, or
the Works Ministry  may not be  sufficiently  selective of the poor), but these options need to
be evaluated.
One  of the  most obvious  ways  around  the both  the  administrative  and  informational
constraints  is to consider  community targeting.  Communities  themselves,  or representative
councils  (for  example  of  village  elders,  religious  groups,  or  NGOs),  can  be  given
responsibility  for  both  identifying  beneficiaries--subject  to  a  given set  of criteria  such  as
landlessness,  being  orphaned,  or destitute--and  for delivering  benefits to them.  The risks of
course are of favoritism,  the political and social difficulties  involved in making decisions on
inclusion  and  exclusion,  and  the  costs  and  labor-intensity  of  organizing,  training,  and
supporting a nationwide network of village groups.
There  is  surprisingly  little  practical  experience  of  community  targeting.  Under  a
program in Rajasthan  in the  1970s,  communities  were  allocated  funds to transfer  to  the  10
poorest  families  in  each  village  and  were  forced  to  publicly  select  (and  announce)  the
households that would receive benefits. The program was successful  in targeting the poorest,
but ultimately collapsed due to erosion of political support  (the very poorest constituting  too
narrow a political base to be worth supporting  on a prolonged basis).  In a drought recovery
program  in Malawi  in 1995-1996  a committee  was to determine  the allocation of free  seed
and fertilizer to the most needy. In most cases the committee decided to give a small amount
to  everyone  rather  than  risk  difficult  and  controversial  decisions  about  who  should  be
included and who left out. More recent experiments  have been tried in Uzbekistan, targeting
child  assistance  through  quasi-religious  groups  called  mahallahs and  in  Armenia,  where
principals and parent-teacher  groups have been used to target school textbook waivers.
16The Fiscal Constraint
Perhaps  the  biggest constraint  to safety  nets in VLICs  is  sheer  affordability.  Total  public
spending is already very low in these countries,  typically averaging  about US$50-US$75  per
person  per  year.  At  the  same  time  the  competing  claims  for  essential  development
investments  are  overwhelming;  the poorest  countries  are  also typically  those  with critically
insufficient  education  capacity,  the least-developed  road  networks,  and the lowest coverage
of water supply or essential health services.
Just  to  illustrate,  a  safety  net  programn  designed  to  provide  a transfer  of US$20  per
annum  (or just  $1.67 per month)  to each of the  poor  in  a typical  VLIC  would  cost in the
neighborhood  of 5 percent  of GDP,  or  21  percent  of total  public  spending,a  level  that  is
probably unaffordable.  7
To  put  this  in  perspective,  we  calculated  that in  the  case  of Malawi,  the  cost of a
relatively  modest program  designed  to reach the  poorest  15  percent  of the  population  and
raise  their  incomes  by just  US$  1 per month  would  cost the equivalent  of the salaries  of
40,000  primary school teachers annually,  or equal the entire  recurrent budget of the Ministry
of Health (Smith 2001). Table  8 illustrates the approximate costs for public transfers relative
to public spending on priority areas in a sample of these countries.
Table 8 - Costs of Large-Scale  Transfer Programs Compared with Existing  Health and
Education Expenditures
(US$  millions  per annum)
Approximate cost of  transferring  US$10
per capita  annually to  Approximate total  public spending  on
Poorest  25
All the poor  percent  Health  Education
Chad  45  18  39  27
Malawi  59  28  65  125
Nepal  97  58  66  162
Niger  63  25  26  46
Tanzania  163  80  87  n.a.
Source: Authors'  calculations.
There  is in the  end no optimum level  of spending  on safety nets.  Obviously there is a
continuum  of  trade-off  between  spending  on  safety  nets  and  other  growth-enhancing
expenditures,  and  there  is  no  way  of defining  the  "right"  mix.  One  of the  issues  worth
looking  at  is  the  efficiency  and  cost-effectiveness  of  government  spending  on  other
interventions.  If  the  composition  of expenditure  is  bad,  or the  efficacy  of other  public
spending on, for example, health,  education, or infrastructure,  is low, then there may be more
of an argument for direct transfers,  essentially  saying  we can't do  much worse, and possibly
6  Based on GDP of US$200-US$300 per capita and public expenditure of 25 percent of GDP.
7Assumes  for illustrative  purposes: 40  percent of population in poverty, a US$20  per capita transfer, plus 30
percent administrative  costs; GDP of $200 p.c.  and public expenditure  of  25 percent of GDP.
17somewhat  better,  by putting  money  directly  in  the hands  of the poor.  The same  argument
may apply to at least some of external  aid resources.
Table 9 below summarizes some of the program choice and design criteria that
decisionmakers may want to take into account in responding to the three constraints:
Table 9 - Program Design Considerations to Account for Critical Constraints
Information constraint  Administrative  capacity  constraints  Fiscal  constraint
Use self-targeting programs  Self-targeting  Selective coverage
Try community targeting  Universal programs  Use existing expenditures to affect
Use proxy indicators  Simple program design  transfers
Universal entitlement  Very limited range of programs  Targeted programs
Use of existing capacity/  "Leverage"  expenditures by
administrative systems  focusing on risk insurance
Sustain same program procedures  Use safety  net expenditures to
over long period  achieve other development  goals
Source:  Authors.
IV. Program Choices
There  are  a  number  of comprehensive  treatments  of the  pros  and cons of various  program
choices and criteria that should go into evaluating their selection (see for example,  Subbarao
et. al.  1997). The analysis in this section focuses only on the special considerations that might
apply  in  very  low  income  countries.  Table  10  outlines  the  range  of programs  that  are
typically used in developing countries.
Cash  Transfers
Cash  transfers  are  the  most  common  forrns  of  direct  transfers  and  include  pensions,
unemployment insurance, and social assistance. All, for different reasons, are not particularly
suited  to  VLICs.  Pensions  are  generally  not  relevant,  because  information  on  age  is
unreliable,  or not available  at all.  (Although there do exist a few exarnples,  the most notable
being  South  Africa,  which  has run  an  effectively  targeted  program  to provide  pensions  to
those not covered by earlier wage employment; however, it is not a very low income country
and illustrates what is possible when there is (i) some surplus to redistribute  and (ii) capable
administrative  apparatus  at the outreach  level.) Unemployment  insurance,  again,  is not very
meaningful  in an environment  where half or more of the population  are subsistence farmers,
and only a very small share of the workforce (and almost none of the poor) is in formal wage
employment.  Social  assistance targeted at the most needy  suffers from the dual problems of
(i)  there  being  no  viable  income  measure  for  identifying  the  poorest  and  (ii)  the  pool  of
potential beneficiaries being so large as to be unaffordable.
18Table 10 - Common Safety Net Programs
Category  Interventions
Cash transfers  - Child benefits
- Public  works
- Pensions
- Unemployment benefits
Food distribution programs  - Free food distribution
- Food for work
- Food stamps
- School feeding
Nutrition  - Child nutrition
- Micronutrietn supplementation
Subsidies  - Food (targeted or self-targeted)
- Health (fee waivers)
- Education (fee waivers)
Agricultural  inputs  - Free packs/vouchers
- Subsidy
Source: Authors.
There may be some scope for tightly targeted  cash transfers  at very specific  groups--for
exanple  orphans,  widows,  and  single-parent  households--both  because  these  groups  are
generally  accepted  as  being  deserving  of support  and  because  there  is  a  demonstrable
correlation  with poverty  status even if income cannot be measured.8 But even then there are
significant  problems  with  identifying  the  beneficiaries  and  administering  targeting.
Furthermore  not  all  orphans  or  widows  are  poor,  many  are  included  in  larger,  nonpoor
households.  As discussed  earlier,  the only obvious way  around  this problem  is  community
targeting,  but  even  then  the  experience  has  been  limited  and  mixed.  Among  the  limited
examples  of cash transfers in very poor countries are the GAPVU  program in Mozambique
(see Box  1).  The general  inclination of decisionmakers  is to prefer transfers  in kind in these
countries.  Even though cash  is more efficient,  it is generally  hard to sell politically;  people
put a premium on cash (which is generally used more by the nonpoor)  such that people will
accept distribution of food to the poor much more  readily than the  distribution  of cash.  The
distribution  of vouchers  or use of selected,  targeted  discounts  for goods  consumed  by the
poor may be more politically acceptable  in these very low income countries
Public  works  is one  of the  few  self-targeting  interventions  available  and  is therefore
particularly attractive in VLICs where information  and targeting capacity are weak.  It has the
8 For example,  in Malawi,  it was clearly demonstrated  that female-headed  households were disproportionately
represented among the poor.
19added  advantage  that,  if works  are  well  chosen,  it  can  create  productive  assets.  Works
programs  are  especially  suited  to VLICs  where  seasonality  of poverty  is  a major  issue,
because  they  can  be  countercyclical,  absorbing  labor  when  it  is  abundant  in  the
nonagricultural  dry season,  and because they can be expanded in times of crisis (for example
during drought or macroeconomic  shocks).
The drawbacks  are that employment programs are a relatively expensive way of making
transfers  (typically  costing  US$2  for  every US$1  of wages  transferred)  and  managerially
complex compared with pure transfer programs. To justify these costs, it is important that the
assets  created  be  carefully  selected  to  contribute  to  raising the  incomes  of the poor  in the
longer run.
Experience  has  shown  that  to  target  the  poorest  with  public  works  it  is  critically
important to get the wage rate right, meaning that it must be set below the prevailing market
wage  for  unskilled  labor,  which  in  these  countries  will  usually  be  the  rate  for  casual
agricultural  day-labor.  Public  employment  has  been used on  a large  scale  in middle-level
developing  countries  (notable  examples  include  Chile,  Mexico,  and  the  Maharastra
Employment  Guarantee  Scheme  in India),  but less  so in very low  income  countries,  where
food-for-work  has  been  the most  common  form,  with the growing use of the Agences  d'
Ex&cution des Travaux d' Interet Public (Executing  Agencies for Public Works Employment
-- AGETIPs) in recent years in urban areas of West Africa.
Food and Nutrition Programs
Untargeted  food  transfers  or  subsidies--whatever  the  form--have  generally  proven
unsustainable  fiscally.  Bangladesh,  Egypt,  India,  Pakistan,  Sri  Lanka,  and  Tunisia  all
initiated  universal  food  transfers  in  the  early  1950s.  The budgetary  cost  of the  programs
gradually increased  in all these  countries.  Thus by the  early  1980s, the cost of a universal
program  was as high as 5 percent of GDP in Sri Lanka and 4 percent in Tunisia.  When the
program was universal,  the share of the transfer benefits of the poor (bottom quintile)  was
generally low; in many countries the benefits were evenly distributed across quintile groups.
Free  food distribution  has  always  enjoyed  a  special  role in the safety net programs  of
most very poor countries, partly because hunger is such an obvious manifestation of extreme
poverty and because these countries are particularly prone to drought, but also because of the
predilection  on  the  part  of the  donor  community  to  provide  food  aid,  and  because  food
distribution  is generally  politically more  acceptable  than  cash.  The drawbacks  are  that  free
food programs distort markets, can create dependency,  and involve large inclusion errors and
leakage  to the  nonpoor.  They are  also  administratively  cumbersome  and  expensive  as they
typically involve moving large amounts of grain around the country.
Food distribution programs  can substitute for market failures  in countries where private
foodgrain  markets  are  poorly  developed  and  there  is clearly  a case  for distribution  during
periods of crop failure or drought. While the fundamental problem is usually insufficiency of
incomes among the poor rather than an aggregate shortage of food, in some cases food is just
not available  at  any price,  especially  in remote  areas.  We  would  generally  recommend  that
food distribution programs be restricted  to emergency  situations (e.g., of periodic  drought, or
20massive refugee  influxes, etc.),  but countries are then left with the problem of nonfungibility
of food aid provided in nonemergency  situations, particularly  from the World Food Program
(WFP).  The preferred  option would be to monetize such  aid and use it to support other, more
optimal  safety  net  programs,  but  if  that  is  not  feasible  linking  distribution  to  a  work
requirement  (e.g.,  food-for-work)  or  to  a national  child nutrition  program  can  help ensure
targeting;  altemately,  food  could  be  channeled  to  community-based  transfer  schemes
supporting the most vulnerable (such as orphans and the disabled) if such programs  exist.
Box  1  - Examples  of Some Public Safety Net Programs  in Very Low Income Countries
Mozambigue  - The  Office  for  Support to  Vulnerable  Population  Groups  (GAPVU)  Launched  following  the
civil war to support destitute groups in urban Mozambique,  the object of GAPVU  was to raise consumption  to a
modest  1700  calories  per day for (i) households  with  malnourished children  under five,  (ii) pregnant  women
exhibiting  nutritional risk factors,  and (iii)  elderly  and disabled  in households  with  no one of working age.  The
transfer amounted to US$ 1.00 per person per month,  enough to raise average consumption  by  13 percent among
beneficiaries  and  to  lift them,  on  average,  from  80  percent to  91  percent  of poverty  line  consumption.  The
transfer is in  cash,  administered  by  a combination  of local  officials  and agencies.  Problems of enforcement  of
criteria  and means testing  led to  some leakage,  and  it is estimated that  30 percent  of the benefits went to the
nonpoor.  By  1996  GAPVW  was  reaching  80,000  households,  or about  16  percent  of the  urban  population.
Evaluations  in  general  concluded  that  the  program  had  a  positive  impact  on  reducing  urban  poverty.  The
drawback of course is that it is exclusively urban, whereas  85 percent of Mozambique's population  and the vast
majority of the poor  live in rural areas.
Malawi  - The  Starter  Pack  Initiative  Following  large  price  increases  for  fertilizer  as  the  result  of subsidy
removal  and devaluations,  in 1996-97 the government  introduced a program to provide small packs of fertilizer
and seeds to  all rural smallholder  farmers (about  2.8 million households,  or 90 percent of the population.)  The
program, justified on the grounds of maintaining  national-level maize  production  and soil fertility in the face  of
a  large  drop  in fertilizer  use,  was  in  essence  a pure  transfer.  The  value  of the  transfer  in  terms  of maize
produced  was about  US$15 per household,  or 50 percent higher than the cost to the government  of providing
the  packs  (US$10  each).  The idea  was  that each  pack  would  cover  about  one-tenth  of a hectare,  enough  to
produce  six  weeks of additional  maize  and thus get families through the worst of the  lean  season.  While  there
was  some leakage  and "double-dipping,"  the program remained  fairly well  targeted  at rural smallholders  and
has been  sustained over a period  of three years.  The drawbacks  were the  total cost at US$ 27 million annually,
more than Malawi  could afford, and the fact that many of those receiving the packs do not need them-they are
not among the very poorest and could afford to buy the small amounts of fertilizer themselves.  This year (2000)
it is  being targeted selectively  using a combination of geographical  and community targeting.
India - The Maharastra  Emplovment Guarantee  Scheme (MEGS) One of the largest and longest-running  public
safety net programs,  MEGS was introduced  in  1973 to provide  employment to the poor in rural Maharastra.  The
objectives  were  to reduce  the  pressure  for  migration  into  Bombay  and  to  provide  employment  especially  to
women  and especially  in  the slack agricultural  season.  An innovative  characteristic  of the scheme  was that it
provided  an guarantee  of employment within  5 kilometers of a person's home;  this, combined  with the fact that
it  was  sustained  over  a  long  period,  allowed  the  poor  to  build  its  income  stream  into  their  expectations,
modifying  behavior  and,  among  other  things,  putting  upward pressure  on  very  low  rural  wage  rates.  At  its
height MEGS created  100 to 180 million person days of employment  each year, at a cost of about US$1.20 per
person-day of employment created.  It has built rural  infrastructure-especially  irrigation works-that have had
a substantial  multiplier effect in terms of contributing  to rural  incomes.  The wage rate was low enough to target
the  poor  until  1988  when  the government  by fiat  doubled  the  minimum wage  (which  equaled  the program
wage);  the result  was job rationing  and erosion  of the  guarantee  element of the scheme,  as well as limiting the
self-targeting  effect.
Source: Subbarao (1997),  Smith (2001).
Many  countries  began  to  switch  from  universal  to  targeted  programs.  The  targeting
approach  of self-selection  was  resorted  to  in  Tunisia  while  Sri  Lanka  switched  to targeted
food  stamps.  Other  countries  such as Bangladesh,  Honduras,  Jamaica,  Jordan,  and  Mexico
21have  also  switched  from  universal  programs.  Apart  from  a  lowering  of budgetary  costs,
significant  gains  in  targeting  efficiency  were  observed  after  a  switch  from  universal
programs.  For example,  in Tunisia the share of the poorest quintile increased from 8 percent
under  a  universal  regime  to  25  percent  after  switching  to  a  self-targeted  food products
program, whereas the cost of the program fell from 4 percent to 2 percent of GDP.
School feeding suffers from large inclusion errors, because it is difficult to feed only the
poor in a given class and, if universal, is probably unaffordable in VLICs.  It was estimated,
for example, that to expand a pilot school-feeding program nationwide in Malawi would have
cost US$200 million annually, or almost one-third of the national budget. An earlier analysis
suggests average  costs equivalent to about  US$24.38 per student per year  (although there is
significant variation).9 If a mid-sized VLIC has 3 million students, this implies expenditures
of  around  US$73  million  annually,  which  is  almost  certainly  unaffordable.  The  only
workable alternative  is to target geographically--providing  meals only in the poorest  areas or
at certain types of schools--as has been done in Costa Rica.
School  feeding  is also  administratively  cumbersome,  disrupting school  and  classroom
management  and  putting  an  additional  burden  on  school  managers.  A  less  disruptive
alternative is "food-for-education,"  providing free handouts, usually bags of grain, to families
whose  children  attend  school  regularly,  as  has  been  done  in  Bangladesh,  Pakistan,  and
Malawi.  The attraction  in both cases  of course  is that school  feeding  can be used to attract
children  to  school.  However  the  value  in  this regard  needs  to  be  weighed  against  other
educational interventions,  for example, there is little point in attracting children into school if
teaching is not effective  and,  in a very tight fiscal  environment,  the same resources  might
better be spent on teacher training and supervision.
The  attraction  of  nutrition  programs  is  that  they  have  a  clear  targeting  criteria.
Furthermore,  experience  suggests that the capacity  is there, even  in very poor  countries,  to
actually  measure  malnutrition  and  to implement  targeted  child  nutrition  programs  through
existing health infrastructure and community workers. They also represent a clear investment
in the future by reducing the long-term effects of malnutrition. The drawbacks  are that they
are  administratively  relatively  complex  and  may  overburden  the  limited  capacity  of
Ministries  of Health.  Also  they  are  often  donor-dependant  and  therefore  susceptible  to
stopping and starting, thus undermining the needed long-term impact.
In  countries  where  there  are  major  seasonal  food  shortages  and  price  spikes,  public
intervention to smooth consumption--either through managed reserves or seasonal subsidies--
is potentially attractive. Examples  include operating a national food reserve, buying surpluses
during  the  harvest  season  and  releasing  stocks  during  the  lean  season;  administered  or
controlled  prices  of essential  foodgrains;  and/or explicit  seasonal  subsidization  of prices.
Such  interventions  were  previously  common  in South  and  East  Asia  and are now  largely
confined to parts of Africa, where private markets are less developed.
The drawbacks are that it is difficult to direct such support specifically at the poor. Risks
include
*  The subsidy being captured by nonpoor consumers, especially the urban population
9  See Annex table A3 for a sample of school-feeding programs  and their costs.
22*  Buying by intermediaries  for resale at the (scarcity-based)  market price
*  Government  often  cannot  afford  to  intervene  on a large-enough  scale to  actually
affect prices and supply; the result is substantial  expenditure on an intervention that
is ultimately ineffective
*  Continued  public  intervention  will  discourage  the  development  of active  private
markets that will eventually intermediate across seasons.
In general  it is recommended  that arms-length  intervention,  affecting  aggregate supply
and demand by purchases  and sales at commercial prices--only  on a selected basis and only
where private markets are clearly not working--is the preferred approach.
Agricultural Inputs
There  is often  an inclination to want to subsidize  agricultural inputs--especially  fertilizer--in
very poor countries partly on grounds of helping the poor and partly on productivity grounds.
As  a  transfer,  the  problem  of course  is that  the  subsidy  benefits  primarily  the  nonpoor:
fertilizer is used in direct proportion to landholding size, it is used more on cash crops, and it
is used more often by large commercial  farmers than by subsistence farmers. If there were a
way of directing fertilizer subsidies at particular farmers or crops it might be part of a safety
net strategy, but so far no means has been found.
Free distribution of very small  amounts of fertilizer and seed may in fact be preferred to
subsidies, in that it is less distorting of agricultural  input markets, and may not be  attractive
to  larger  farmers.  Agricultural  input programs  for the rural  poor are  increasingly  popular.
Among  others  Zambia,  Mexico,  Malawi,  and  Zimbabwe  are  currently  running,  or
considering  such  programs.  The  attraction  is the  "multiplier"  effect,  in that the  value  of
benefits is leveraged by the investment  of the poor of their own labor and natural  inputs of
water,  sun,  etc.  (In  Malawi  for  example,  we  calculated  the  value  of the  benefits  to  the
household were on average  1.5 times the cost of the package provided; while  evidence  from
Mexico suggests that the net income effect of a targeted cash injection at the time of planting
was between  1.5 and 2.6 times.'0) Also, such distribution may compensate for market failures
where  rural input markets do not function effectively  and universal subsidies or government
marketing  systems have been withdrawn  suddenly.  Some rules of thumb probably  apply to
minimize the distortionary effects: packages should be kept very small, so they are generally
relevant only to the poorest; vouchers in general  are preferred to commodity distribution;  and
targeted distribution is preferable, but there are often problems in identifying beneficiaries.
V. Social and Political  Issues: Some Additional Program Design
Considerations
Problems of Inclusion and Exclusion in Very Low Income Countries
Any  form  of targeting  presents  problems of inclusion,  inadvertently  providing  benefits to
those who don't need  them, and exclusion,  leaving out those who do need them.  These are
particularly  stark  in  very  poor  countries  where  the  difference  between  the  poor  and  the
nonpoor  (or  between  the  poor  and  the  poorest)  will  be  less  pronounced.  It  is  worth
10  Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Davis (2001).
23remembering that in a US$200 per capita income country the average person is living on less
than  US$0.60  per  day  and  that  even  people  in  the  7th  income  decile  (that  is,  among  the
wealthiest  30 percent  of the  population)  will be  poorer than those who would  normally be
targeted  for public transfers  in other,  moderately poor countries.  (For example,  someone  in
the  7"h  decile  in Nepal  will be earning approximately US$180  per annum,  which would put
them among the poorest 10 percent of the population in Bolivia or the Philippines." )
Geographical  targeting is the most administratively easy and where poverty data is good
can  provide  a  defensible  basis  for  being  selective  without  having  to  choose  individual
households.  With a tight budget constraint, geographical  targeting is often the only easy way
of reducing  the scale of a program. The drawback is that it can produce huge  inclusion and
exclusion errors. Put simply, there are many nonpoor people in poor areas (who will receive
benefits under a geographically targeted program) and many poor people in nonpoor districts
or regions who will be left out. Estimates from Malawi  suggest, for example, that focusing on
the  poorest third of the country would  leave out as much  as  60 percent of those below the
poverty  line.  12  Clearly the answer to this lies  in how strongly poverty  is  concentrated  in a
given area.
One form of geographical targeting  that almost always appears to be valid in very poor
countries  however  is  rural  targeting,  i.e.,  selecting  rural  over  urban  areas.  While  urban
poverty  is no doubt a  serious  issue, the evidence  is compelling that in this set of countries,
the rural population is  so much  worse off on average  that governments cannot  go far wrong
by selecting programs that concentrate on them.
Table 11 - Urban-Rural Differences  in Selected  Very Low Income Countries
(Nominal  average per capita expenditure - local  currency, various survey years)
Rural  Urban
Poorest  20 percent  Poorest  60 percent  Poorest  20 percent
Mali(francs)  15  27  47
Niger (francs)  15  35  57
Tanzania (shillings)  36  56  58
Ethiopia (birr)  396  600  550
Source: Country household income/expenditure  surveys, various years.
Table 11  illustrates the differences  in per capita average expenditures  between rural and
urban areas for selected VLICs. While these estimates are not all adjusted for the higher costs
of living  in towns  (which  can be  substantial),  they  nonetheless  show  clearly  that average
consumption for even moderately well-off people in rural areas is less than that of all but the
very poorest  in urban  areas,  suggesting  that  a transfer program that focused  on rural  areas
1"  These comparisons  hold even adjusting for purchasing power parity; for example,  the average  income in the
bottom  decile  in the  Philippines  is estimated  at US$288  per  annum  (1997),  and US$880  per annum  in PPP
terms, compared with approximately US$825 per annum in PPP terms for people in the 7k" decile in Nepal.
12  Defined under the Vulnerability  Assessment  Mapping exercise,  based largely  on per capita food  production.
However imperfect, this is often the only type of measure readily available in VLICs.
24alone  will  almost  certainly  be  progressive  in  poverty  reduction  termns.  Figure  3  below
illustrates the same point graphically in the case of Niger.
Figure 3: Urban and Rural Consumption Distributions in Niger,  1995
Niger - Urban/Rural  Distribution Among  the  Poorest 50%
80  9Rura*
E  20  _  _  _  _  _I  R  __a_I_  _11
1  2  3  4  5j
Decile
Source: Niger household income/expenditure  survey,  1996.
Community  targeting,  as  discussed  earlier,  is potentially  a way of reducing  inclusion
and exclusion errors.  There is little empirical evidence on how much inclusion--or exclusion-
-of the poor takes place  as a result of community  targeting.  Recent work by Ravallion  and
Galasso (1999)  on a community-targeted  food program in Bangladesh found that on average
the poor benefited,  but that there  was wide variation  from community to community,  with--
somewhat worryingly--more  exclusion of the poor in villages that had a wider distribution of
income,  reflecting  the poor's  relatively  lesser  weight  in the  decisionmaking  process.  They
also  found that  as the  degree  of coverage  increased,  the proportion  of the  poor receiving
*  benefits increased,  while the proportion  of the nonpoor did not, suggesting an "early capture"
of benefits  by  the  nonpoor.  The  implication  is that  wider  coverage  may  result  in  greater
proportional inclusion of the poor under community targeting.1 3
As we've noted, politicians and the population  as a whole in very low income countries
are  often not convinced  there is a sufficient  distinction between the poor and the nonpoor to
support  programs that only reach, say, the poorest  10 percent  to 30 percent of the population,
and  therefore  prefer  universal  programs  (which  are  of  course  much  more  palatable
politically).  There is  a strong political  economy  argument  in favor of universality;  universal
programs  enjoy wide popular support  and, because  they deliver  benefits to the middle class
and  the  political  elite  (or  at  least  to  their  relatives),  they  tend  to  be protected  when  more
narrowly focused programs would be cut.1 4
The issues are the degree of the inclusion error and the fiscal  cost. If the distribution of
income  is  fairly  low  and  uniform,  with  the  exception  of the  richest  few  percent,  then
inclusion  errors  will  be  relatively  smaller.  (For  example  in  Chad  only  27  percent  of the
benefits  of a  universal  program  would  go  to  those  with  incomes  above  US$1  per  day,
whereas  in Zimbabwe  64 percent  would.)  Also,  keeping the  size of the  transfer  small  will
tend to self-target  the poor to some extent,  as the better-off either can't be bothered to apply
13 For a recent treatment of the issues and experience  with community targeting see Conning and Kevane(1999).
14  There  is also  some  evidence  that  total  welfare  may be  higher with  universal  programs;  see  Gelbach  and
Pritchett (2002).
25for  the  benefit  or  prefer  to  avoid  the  stigma  of doing  so.  (Examples  include  the  public
pension in Namibia, which was pitched at a level that was unattractive to the white elite; the
Starter  Pack  in  Malawi,  where  a  10  kilogram  pack  of fertilizer,  while  useful,  was  not
particularly  relevant to  large farmers;  and  the provision  of lower-grade  broken rice in  Sri
Lanka, which was not wanted by those who could afford a better grade.)
The problem  however  is  one of cost:  universal  programs  are  ultimately  unaffordable.
Table  12  illustrates  the  approximate  cost of a universal  program  intended  to transfer just
US$10 per year (US$0.03 per day) in a range of poor countries.
Table 12 - Annual Cost of a Universal Transfer of US$10 Per Capita - Selected Countries
(US$ millions)
Universal  transfere  Total public expenditure
Ethiopia  700  1,500
Malawi  126  600
Nepal  265  830
Niger  115  350
a Assumes 15  percent in distribution and administrative costs.
Source: Author's calculations.
Traditional  Social Protection  and the Link with Private Transfers
In all  societies there  is  a complex web  of private  transfers,  family  and community  support,
and  informal  social  protection.  In  very  low income  countries  these  mechanisms  are  both
more  and  less  relevant  than  elsewhere.  More  relevant  historically  because  the  public
apparatus  has not existed and social insurance and welfare had of necessity to be catered for
by private transfers, usually intergenerational,  between members of the extended family, but
also, for  example, between  landlords  and tenants.  However,  these  systems  are  increasingly
breaking  down  under  the  pressure  of population  growth;  rapidly  changing  relations  of
production,  including changes  in land and labor markets;  and urbanization and monetization
of subsistence economies.
There is also evidence that informal transfers are less relevant  in very poor economies.
For one thing, where people are universally poor, they have  less to share. Also, the counties
we are concerned  with--in the US$200-300  income  range--are  typically less  urbanized  and
have  less of the population in wage employment than in more moderately-poor  countries,  so
that  the phenomenon  of transfers  from town-dwelling  and  employed  relatives,  while  still
existent,  is less important than in, for example, the more  developed  areas of West Africa  or
the more commercial parts of South Asia (see Table  13).
26Table 13 - Share of the Population in Urban and Agricultural Areas, Selected  Very Low and
Moderate Income Countries, 1999
(percent)
Urban  In agriculture
Very low income countries
Burkina Faso  17  93
Etiopfa  17  86
Malawi  22  87
Nepal  11  95
Moderately  poor countries
Bolivia  61  46
Egypt  45  30
Ghana  37  60
Zambia  39  70
Source:  World Development  Indicators, 2001.
Morduch (1999) points out that while transfers are  significant in middle-poor countries
(e.g.,  in South Africa,  where 40 percent of households  received informal transfers,  Columbia
46 percent, and the Philippines 89 percent of rural households) in poorer countries they are of
relatively minor consequence  (e.g., in poorer areas of south India, in Burkina Faso, and in the
Sahel  after  a  drought,  where  informal  transfers  compensated  for  less  than  3 percent  of
losses).  He  also  concludes  that  for  a  number  of reasons  the  risk of displacing  informal
transfers is substantially  lower in low-income countries because there are fewer migrants and
employed  and  because  mechanisms  like reciprocal  exchange  and group  insurance  work best
among  slightly  better-off  and  in  the  absence  of large  covariate  shocks  (like  drought,  or
HIV/AIDS).
In the countries we are concerned with,  informal  social protection may anyway be sub-
optimal from a poverty reduction point of view, as the poor engage  in behavior that amounts
to  trading  reduced  risk  for  lower  average  returns  (for  example  by  entering  into  share-
cropping or bonded labor arrangements,  or eschewing higher-return  cash crops).
Whether  or not to displace private  transfers is an important  question that needs careful
analysis  while  designing  publicly  funded  safety  net  programs.  Much  depends  on  the
distributional  impacts  of current  private  transfers.  Evidence  suggests  that  there  is  much
variation  in the  distributional  impacts  of private  transfers.  In the Philippines,  for  example,
most private transfers  appear to  be  from the  poor to  the poor.  By contrast,  in  Peru,  private
transfers  significantly  increase  the  aggregate  consumption  of  the  poorest  decile  by  14
percent,  implying that transfers in this country are distributionally propoor (Cox and Jimenez
1989).  Whatever be the impact of private transfers on poverty,  one thing appears to be clear:
most private transfers seem to dwindle in a situation of a covariate  shock such as drought or
macroeconomic  crisis. Even in the relatively well-off countries of East Asia where informal
transfers  have  historically  remained  robust,  the  recent  financial  crisis  has  resulted  in the
elderly inadequately  protected  by such transfers  inasmuch  as the  poverty incidence  among
the elderly following the crisis was higher than the national average.  Following a drought,  in
27Namibia too, private transfers  seem to diminish  (Subbarao  1997). All this seems to suggest
that,  given  the  depth  and  breadth  of poverty  in very  low  income  countries,  safety  net
programs that address  covariate risks  (such  as public works)  seem  least likely to crowd out
private transfers. As for cash and food transfers, the design of programs needs to be based on
a careful empirical analysis of prevailing private transfers.
Aid Dependency and the Role of Donors
Very  low income  countries  tend  to be  heavily  aid-dependent.  Often the  choice  of transfer
programs  is driven by what is on offer from donors, or the availability of food or relief aid,
rather than  the "right"  choice  of intervention.  This is to some  extent  inevitable but can be
overcome by governments taking a firm lead in formulating a national safety net strategy into
which assistance can be channeled.
A more immediate  practical problem is that donor programs tend to stop and start, often
not lasting more than a few years--or at most a decade--and  then being replaced by some new
initiative.  As a result  efficient,  consistent  systems  are not  developed.  This  is particularly
costly in countries where the administrative  capacity is weak, as it means that low-level staff
and supervisors must learn complex new implementation  arrangements every few years, with
a predictable loss of efficiency and effectiveness in program delivery. Part of the solution is
for  donors  to  commit  to  long-term  support  for  programs  and  to  maintain  basic  program
design--even if imperfect--unless  there is an absolutely  compelling reason to change  it.
Another problem with having a plethora of discrete donor programs  is that the coverage
of beneficiaries  is not coordinated. 1 5 Programs designed in isolation by different donors often
lack  a  common  definition of whom  the  beneficiaries  should  be,  or of what  the  scale  or
objectives  of transfers  should be. In the extreme  case, this can result in some households  or
areas benefiting from several programs, while others are not covered at all.
Finally,  concern  is  expressed  that governments  should  not use  aid resources  to  fund
transfers.  We  would  suggest  that is  not really  the right  question.  The  issue  is what  is the
"right" safety net program and how much it makes sense to spend out of public resources  on
transfers  to  the poor  given  the  specific  conditions  of that  country:  the  nature  of poverty,
competing  public  expenditures,  and  whether or  not there  are  efficient  program instruments
available. Once these questions are settled, the source of funding for a safety net program, as
part  of an  overall  public  expenditure  package,  should  be  irrelevant.  Parenthetically,  it  is
worth noting that putting money in the hands of the poor can yield very high rates of return,
partly because they use their assets so intensively and partly because the cost of falling below
a critical consumption  level is so great, small amounts can yield a high effective return.  So it
is quite possible, given the ineffectiveness  of many  aid expenditures,  that--provided that the
broad  country policy  framework  is  right--financing  direct  transfers to the poor may be an
extremely  good use of aid resources.
15  In  Malawi,  for  example,  there  were  found  to  be  some  15  different  public  works,  feeding,  and transfer
programs funded by various donors.
28VI.  Conclusions
Even in the poorest of countries, safety net programs have a role to play. However, there are
major  problems  of affordability  and  administrative  feasibility.  How  much  expenditure  is
justified, what types of programs  are to be floated, and how these are to be designed,  depends
very  much  on  three  factors:  (i)  the  degree  of uninsured  risk  faced  by  the  poor,  (ii)  the
feasibility  of identifying the groups that are subjected to high level of uninsured risks (such
as orphans), and (iii) the depth and severity of poverty.
The  challenge  in very  low  income  countries  is  to  find  ways  in which  the  choice  of
programs  can  both  limit  total  cost  and  reduce  the  opportunity  cost  of other  investments
foregone.  Clearly  the  requirements  of the  poor  and  selection  of instruments  need  to  be
worked out on a country-by-country  basis; however,  a number of principles  emerge from the
analysis in this paper that should apply across most very poor countries:
*  Use safety net expenditures  to fund investments  that lift longer-run  impediments  to
growth.  Examples  include  public works programs that construct  roads or irrigation
works (although it is important that the right infrastructure be chosen)  or fee waiver
programs that increase school enrollments and hence the investment in education.
*  For pure  transfers, be selective:  try to identify  a sub-group  of the ultra-poor or be
selective  of very distinct  groups that  everyone  can agree  are  deserving  of support.
Examples might include  the disabled,  orphans,  or street children. Not only does this
limit total  costs to a  manageable  level,  but  it increases  the probability  of securing
popular support and the likelihood that programs will be sustained.
*  Choose transfers that have a multiplier effect. For example, it was found that every
dollar spent on the PROCAMPO program in Mexico generated US$1.60 to US$2.40
of income.  Similarly, the  Starter  Pack program  in Malawi  yielded  a consumption
increase of about  150 percent of the cost of the fertilizer provided.
*  Judicious  choice of timing can  also  optimize  the  impact of transfers  (for example
providing  funds  at  planting  time,  or  during  the  lean  season  when  employment
income is unavailable).
*  "Leverage"  spending  on  safety  nets  by using  limited  injections  of cash to  insure
against  risks--for  example,  limited  funding  during times  of drought  or  economic
crisis may mean that the poor do not have to sell off land or cattle--to allow the poor
to diversify their income-earning opportunities  (for example by taking on the risk of
planting cash crops).
*  Use  safety  net  expenditures  that  simultaneously  contribute  to  human  capital
development.  Examples  include  child nutrition  programs that alleviate  the long-run
debilitation resulting from acute childhood nutrition, or fee waiver programs that not
only provide an immediate transfer to the poor, but also increase the stock of trained
personnel in the long run.
*  Choose  one  or two  simple program  designs  and  adhere  to them  over  a sustained
period.
*  Periodic  evaluation  of programs  is  absolutely  essential.  Such evaluation  alone can
throw  light  on  what  is  working  and  what  is  not  and  allows  for  reform  and
consolidation of programs where needed.
Finally,  what  further  strategic  guidance  can we  provide  for  very poor countries  with
respect  to  striking  a  balance  between  investments  for  growth  (roads,  water,  health,  and
29education)  and  transfers,  both  of which  compete  for  public  resources?  We  suggest  that
countries  decide  on the choice and coverage of safety net interventions  using the following
steps:
(i)  Re-examine the main constraints to growth and the role of public investment policy in
overcoming these constraints
(ii)  Conduct a vulnerability assessment and identify the main risks poor people  confront
(i.e., systemic such as monsoon failures or idiosyncratic such as illness [HIV/AIDS])
(iii)  Identify policy interventions  that have the potential  for both reducing vulnerability
and for enhancing growth prospects  at the same time, thus reducing the potential
difficult trade-offs between  safety net programs and growth-enhancing  measures.
An  example  helps  to  illustrate  the  above.  A  vulnerability  assessment  for  Kenya
(Christiaensen  and  Subbarao  2001)  has  shown  that  rural  communities  exposed  to
fever/malaria  and  related  sickness  and  communities  living  in  the  hinterland  cut  off from
market  centers  and  lacking  basic  infrastructural  facilities,  experience  both  serious
consumption  shocks  (i.e., shortfalls  in mean consumption),  as well as substantial  variability
in consumption. A recent study estimated the current loss of GNP in sub-Saharan Africa due
to malaria to be 20 percent.  It follows that a policy that controls malaria and related sickness
and policy interventions  that improve  access to rural market centers have  great potential  for
reducing  the poor's  vulnerability  to  consumption  losses,  and thus  serve  as good  safety net
interventions.  It is  also  clear that  neither  intervention  requires  a targeted  approach  and  as
such ideal for countries such as (rural) Kenya where it is so difficult to identify the very poor
from those poor who can make do without any intervention.  This then is the kind of solution
that needs to be found to the dilemma of providing safety nets in very low income countries:
ones  that  reconcile  the  trade-off  between  transfers  and  more  orthodox  growth-enhancing
expenditures, that is built on an analytical  understanding of vulnerability,  and that minimizes
the difficulties of targeting.
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32Annex
Table Al  - Infant Mortality by Income  Class, 1997-99 - Selected  Countries
Ratio of  richest to
Poorest  20 percent  Middle 20  percent  Richest 20 percent  poorest  20 percent
Kenya  90  56  45  2.0
Madagascar  128  103  73  1.8
Mali  157  156  98  1.6
Senegal  101  70  47  2.1
Tanzania  116  89  66  1.8
Source:  World Development Indicators  ( various years)
Table A2 - Sample of Public Works Programs - Scale  and Costs, Various Countries
Scale of  operations  Total cost (wage and  nonwage)  Ratio of wage
(Million person-days  per person-day of employment  cost to total
Country, year, andprogram  p.a.)  created  (US$)  cost
Bangladesh  1991-92, FFW  15  1.6  0.5
India 1991-92  850  1.3  0.6
India  1991-92,  MEGS  100-180  1.2  0.51
Pakistan  1992,  CFW  5.2  2.8  0.6
(IGPRA)
Philippines  1990, CFW  0.3  3.2  0.5
Botswana  1992-93, CFW  7  1.7  0.63
Ghana  1988-91  0.5  3.4  0.2
Kenya  1992-93,  CFW  0.6  3.0  0.3-0.4
Bolivia 1982-90  8-9  8.0  0.3
Chile 1987,  CFW  40-45  0.5  0.4
Honduras  1990-91, CFW  2.5  1.0  0.4
Costa Rice  1991-94, CFW  9  4.0
FFW: Food for Work.
CFW: Cash for Work.
JRY: Jawahar  Rojgar Yojna,  a nationwide program of public works.
MEGS: Maharstra Employment Guarantee  Scheme.
IGPRA: Income Generation Program for Refugee  Areas supported by United Nations  agencies.
Source: Subbarao and others  (1997).
33Table A3 - Characteristics of Selected School Feeding Programs
Cost per 1,000  Estimated
Days per  calories/day  over  Number of  annual  cost
Ration  year  365 days (US$)  beneficiaries  (US$ millions)
Tamil-Nadu mid-day meal  418  200  67.02  n.a.  n.a.
Guatemala  456  165  19.25  1,099,000  4.3
Gambia  858  196  81.46  376,202  14.1
Nepal 3718 (mix of  622  293  56.50  377,650  10.7
Maternal  and Child Health
and Social Fund)
Source:  World Bank data.
Table A4 - Estimated Unit Costs of Various Feeding Programs
(1988 Cost - US$ per 1,000 calories delivered per person per day per year)
Region/program type  Mean cost (USS)  Number ofprograms
Asia  91.29  21
Africa  78.95  5
Latin America  87.86  21
Maternal and Child Health (MCH)  85.64  37
feeding
School feeding  88.74  11
Source:  World Bank data.
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Smith and Subbarao consider the vexing question of what role safety  net transfers should play in very
low income countries where a large share of the population  lives in absolute poverty and the state
has very limited resources to fund transfers. They explore three fundamental  constraints,  all of which
are accentuated in  these countries,  the availability of accurate  information to identify beneficiaries,
the administrative  capacity to target them,  and the fiscal affordability of transfers and assess the
implications for program choice and design
They conclude that at expected growth rates the number of people living below minimum acceptable
consumption levels will remain  so high that some form of safety net intervention is justified, but that
to minimize the fiscal trade-off,  safety net expenditures should be used to simultaneously finance
other investments that contribute to long-run poverty reduction (such as roads or irrigation works
under public employment schemes).  Second, for pure transfers, governments should be selective of
very specific groups-such as orphans-to limit costs and engender political support. Third, to improve
the  impact per dollar spent on transfers,  programs should be selected that have a multiplier effect
on incomes (examples  include vouchers for small fertilizer packs for the poor), or leveraged by using
the small  amounts of cash to help households reduce risk or diversify economic activity. Fourth, to
get around the information  constraint, choose programs that are self-targeting, such as public works
at a low wage rate or subsidized inferior food goods.  Fifth, the judicious timing of transfers is important,
for example,  during the lean  season when the opportunity cost of labor is lowest, or just before
planting time. And finally, programs should be kept as simple as possible to fit with the limited
<}administrative capacity, avoiding multiple, overlapping donor programs in favor of one or tvvo simple
nationwide programs that are easily implementable, cost-effective, and fiscally sustainable.
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